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1. Introduction 
What determines export performance? In a landmark paper, Carlin, Glyn and Van Reenen 
(2001) investigated the role of unit labour costs on relative exports among 14 countries 
OECD. They concluded that while relative unit labour costs and indices of technological 
advancement are important, they cannot by themselves explain entirely the development in 
export shares. Among the factors that are suggested as missing include ‘deep structural 
characteristics’ of these economies. Our overall objective in this paper is to investigate the 
role in shaping export performance played by two sets of such ‘deep characteristics’, namely 
the size of the government sector, and labour and product market ‘institutions’.  
  
The paper is related to various strands of existing literature. Firstly, it touches on the relation 
between competitiveness and export performance. While international competitiveness is not 
always straightforward (see, e.g., Krugman, 1993), unit labour costs are widely considered as 
the source of comparative advantage. Unit labour costs have been found to be significant 
determinants in empirical export regressions (Fagerberg, 1988; Carlin et al., 2001; Leon-
Ledesma, 2005; Cavallaro and Mulino, 2008). Additionally, new trade theory emphasises the 
role of monopolistic competition and R&D-supported product differentiation as key export 
drivers(see Helpman and Krugman, 1985; empirical validation of these models can be found 
in Hummels and Levinsohn, 1993; Leon-Ledesma, 2005; and Cavallaro and Mulino, 2009). 
The specialisation via R&D has been set as the major target for many OECD economies that 
cannot compete in cost compression with newly industrialised countries. The remarkable 
decline in export shares of OECD countries (see Figure 1 below) is likely to reflect the failure 
of many advanced economies to transform their production towards more knowledge-
intensive activities thus leading to losses in international market shares. A natural question is 
what has caused delays in this transformation process, leading to a worsening export 
performance. A possible answer may lie in the institutional, regulatory, or labour market 
rigidities of those countries. For instance, Nicoletti and Scarpetta(2003) find that a high 
degree of rigidity in the labour market raises substantially the cost of production preventing 
resources from moving quickly and causelessly towards more productive activities. This 
leads on to a second branch of literature on ‘institutions’, particularly the role of labour 
market and product market institutions. The role of the former in affecting unemployment has 
been widely investigated and debated (see e.g., Nickell, 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). 
Among the latter, product market competition has been argued to affect wages and 
3 
 
unemployment (Griffith, Harrison and Macartney, 2007); entry regulation for new firms is 
seen as detrimental to firm entry and growth (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-DeSilanes and 
Shleifer, 2002; Koeniger and Prat, 2007). The current paper contributes to the literature by 
analysing whether various institutional features such as aspects of labour market rigidity or 
entrepreneurship have impacted on export performance via R&D investment. As this set of 
institutional features has been added to the relative unit labour costs as basic determinants of 
export performance, we are able to at least partially meet the challenge set by Carlin et al. 
(2001), namely to uncover some of the deep institutional determinants of export performance.  
 
Equally importantly, a third branch of literature to which the paper is related concerns the 
macroeconomic effects of government size, which continues to be a focus of contention in 
the literature. Critics (see for instance a National Heritage Foundation webpage, Mitchell, 
2005) argue that government displaces or crowds out utility-enhancing private consumption 
by essentially inefficient, often totally wasteful, public consumption. A purely redistributive 
type of taxation, moreover, may breed distortion, corruption and dependence or moral hazard 
(Sinn, 1995). Proponents of government spending and the welfare state (e.g., Atkinson, 
1995a, 1995b) question the specifics of many of these arguments, view the international 
evidence on the government spending-growth relation as mixed, and conclude that the debate 
is still open. La Porta et al. (1999) caution that "larger governments tend to be the better 
performing ones" (p. 222), and "identifying big government with bad government can be 
highly misleading" (p. 266). In their discussion of this paper, Gordon and Wang (2004) 
concur with this circumspect view. In his review of the endogenous growth evidence, Temple 
(1999, p. 145) concludes that “…it would be wrong to argue that a correlation between small 
government and fast growth leaps out from the data.” Thus, one is left to conclude that 
despite the often politically charged nature of the debate, the evidence is not strong either 
way, and that the role of government in providing a spurt (or otherwise) to production, 
growth, or other measures of macroeconomic performance is a fruitful, indeed urgent, area 
for future research. This paper should be seen as a contribution in this line of investigation.  
 
Starting at least with Aschauer (1989) and Barro (1990), there is a formidable tradition in the 
theoretical literature that emphasises the beneficial effects of productive public services such 
as administration, maintenance of the rule of law, investment in infrastructure, promotion of 
human capital via education and health, and delineation of property rights and contract 
enforcement. Further contributions in this tradition include Futagami, Morita and Shibata, 
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(1993), Fisher and Turnovsky (1995), Turnovsky (1996, 2000), Tsoukis and Miller (2003), 
Ghosh and Roy (2004); Irmen and Kuehnel (2009) provide a survey of this literature. On the 
empirical side, there is fairly clear-cut evidence that public investment on infrastructure has a 
beneficial effect on growth (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Demetriades and Mamuneas, 2000; 
Canning and Pedroni, 2008). On the expenditures on services or non-infrastructural public 
goods, the evidence is less clear-cut; Levine and Renelt (1992) finds that the evidence is not 
robust in this respect; but nor are of course the vast majority of explanatory variables in 
growth regressions. Non-robustness is the picture that one also gets from the information on 
‘Government’-related variables shown in the Table in Appendix 2 of the follow-up survey on 
new growth empirics (Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005).  Thus, the state of the empirical 
literature also seems to call for further research.  
 
A more nuanced view would therefore combine both aspects of public services, the 
productivity-enhancing one and the disincentives induced by higher taxation, and would 
proceed broadly along the lines of reasoning proposed by Barro (1990): The growth-
government size relation may be summarised by a hump-shaped curve; this is due to the fact 
that some essential public services foster growth, as they complement private capital in the 
production function. This effect is however subject to diminishing returns; beyond a certain 
point, the cost of these services (taxation) begins to dominate, so that further expansion of 
government decreases growth. There is thus a conceptually clear, but harder to pin down 
empirically, optimal size of government.1Our paper continues on this front by investigating 
the contribution of government size to relative exports, another measure of macroeconomic 
performance, both theoretically and empirically.  
 
Alesina (1999) interprets the international evidence as showing countries with low incomes 
tend to have inefficient, insufficient and corrupt government, while at high incomes, 
government is too much and generates some kind of addiction from public services, with 
concomitant too high taxation. This view parallels the reasoning of Barro (1990), if arguably 
with the reverse order of causality (in Barro, causality goes from public services to growth, 
whereas in Alesina’s reasoning, it is the opposite direction). In any case, we do find a hump-
shaped curve of export performance versus the size of the welfare state in both the theoretical 
and empirical part of our investigation along the lines of Barro (1990).  
                                                            
1Karras (1996) provides one of the precious few attempts to empirically implement this idea and determine 
whether public services are optimally provided or not. 
5 
 
 
Another precursor to this paper is Alesina and Perotti (1997) which studies theoretically and 
empirically the effects on competitiveness of redistribution financed by distortionary 
taxation. Their empirical part confirms the theoretical predictions: For instance, a rise in 
labour tax by 1% of GDP increases unit labour costs by as much as 3%. They also find that a 
key institutional feature of the labour market, notably the degree of centralisation of the wage 
bargaining, has an important effect, with the above effect being highest in countries with an 
intermediate level of centralisation. Though related, our line of investigation has a different 
focus from this paper, namely we enquire about the determinants of export performance; 
thus, competitiveness is an explanatory, rather than a dependent, variable. Our contribution 
over the Carlin et al. (2001) findings has been noted, which is that we are able to highlight 
some of the ‘institutions’ and government size that determine export performance in addition 
to the relative unit labour costs. Data availability implies that our data sample consists of 18 
countries for the period 1980-2005, a more recent and extensive panel than both studies 
mentioned above (compared to 14 countries for 1960-1990 in Alesina-Perotti and 14 
countries for 1970-92 for Carlin et al., 2001). 
 
The nature of our investigation is dual, both theoretical and empirical: In a theoretical model, 
we analyse relative export performance in a setup that draws on the vintage model of 
Dorfman, Dornbusch and Samuelson (1977). This model determines market capture (share of 
a unit-mass of goods produced by each of two countries) based on unit labour costs in a 
monopolistically competitive product market. On this basic setup the role of the state sector 
and institutions in promoting export performance are investigated: Labour market institutions 
are captured by the introduction of unions and their attributes in shaping unit labour costs. 
Furthermore, using a model in which productive public services complement private capital 
in the production function but require taxes in order to be funded, we show that 
‘government’, as a purveyor of public services, indeed exerts a non-linear role along the lines 
of Barro (1990).  
 
In the empirical part, we investigate the relation between export performance, labour and 
product market institutions, and the size of government as measured by the total tax revenue-
GDP ratio. Our estimates consistently and robustly reveal a significant, non-linear role for the 
state, and verify the existence of a Barro-type curve of export performance versus our 
measure of state size. The estimates imply an export-maximising tax-GDP ratio of around 
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40%. We also look at various institutional aspects related to labour (intensity of trade 
unionism, employment protection) and product (barriers to entrepreneurship, competition, 
and FDI; and overall product market regulation)markets. The product market-related 
institutional features that we consider do play a negative and significant role in affecting 
international export shares, via a negative effect on the effectiveness of R&D expenditures; 
but we could not uncover any significant role for labour market-related rigidities. Among 
more traditional determinants of export performance, relative unit labour costs and the R&D 
share in GDP turn up as expected, while the share of purely social (i.e., non-productive) 
expenditures in GDP turn up negatively and significantly, in a way reminiscent of Alesina 
and Perotti (1997). The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 develops an analytical model 
that informs the subsequent empirical analysis, Section 3 contains the baseline regressions, 
Section 4 implements some robustness and sensitivity analyses, while Section 5 concludes. 
Appendices A and B have more information about the construction of the relative unit labour 
cost variable and descriptive information about the series used in this study.  
 
 
2. A Model of the state sector and export performance 
 
As mentioned, the model seeks to uncover the channels of influence of the size of the state 
sector on export performance. While the tax rate reduces competitiveness (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1997), it may also increase productivity via its support of productive public services 
(Barro, 1990). Such services include basic administration, support of the rule of law, health 
and education services, a clear delineation of property rights and contract enforcement. To 
bring these arguments to bear on export performance, we follow the dynamic Ricardian 
model of Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977;see also Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, 
Chapter 4) coupled with monopolistic competition in the product and labour markets 
(something missing from the original model). We also combine this with productive public 
services in the manner of Barro (1990) so as to analyse the role of government and the 
welfare state in terms of export performance. In contrast to the supply-side model of Barro 
(19990), here we have a model in which demand is determined first, and then labour demand 
is determined residually. More technically, we shall also use a CES production function, 
which introduces the possibility of unemployment in the labour market, and hence a 
meaningful role for trade unionism. This links up with a rich literature on the effects of union 
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behaviour. While these should be valuable extensions of DFS (1977) in their own right, the 
main focus here is to highlight the link between state size and taxation on the one hand and 
competitiveness and export performance on the other. 
 
Accordingly, there is a continuum of goods, i∈[0,1] that are internationally tradable. A 
fraction 0<z<1 of them is produced by the Home economy (H), and the rest by the Foreign 
economy (F - the latter will be indicated by starred variables). We indicate by αi and αi* the 
unit labour requirements (inverse productivity) for each good i in each of the two countries. 
Thus, the ratio A(i)≡αi*/αi indicates the relative productivity of H concerning good i. Later 
on, we shall consider also broader interpretations of productivity and A(i) that bear on 
institutions. We index the goods such that A(i) falls as i rises; in other words, H has a relative 
productivity advantage for goods with a low i and F in those with a high i.  
The utility of the representative domestic agent has the following structure: 
   θθ 	
 
θ
θ  1  δ      (1) 
Utility is made up of two components, firstly a consumption aggregate and secondly a term 
reflecting the utility of leisure. The consumption sub-utility is a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
aggregate of all globally produced, and consumed, individual goods; it is assumed that, 
globally, there exists a unit mass of differentiated goods, each subscripted by and 
characterised by elasticity of substitution θ>1,produced by monopolistically competitive 
firms (see Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987). All quantities refer to the representative agent, and 
because of symmetry, they are identical to aggregate bundles.  
 
We follow Alesina and Perotti (1997) in the treatment of leisure in utility: It is weighted by δ 
and it is valued at the exogenous utility of leisure R, if the individual is unemployed; if they 
work, there is no utility of leisure. There is no proper leisure-labour choice here; the 
unemployment rate (0<u<1) will be decided by the conditions in the labour market, and a 
fraction u of each individual’s time is involuntarily spent out of work.   
Given the monopolistic structure, the associated price level is:  
    θ 	
/θ  1      (2) 
This is normalised to unity; in other words, the numeraire is the global basket of goods, but 
we shall keep it for completeness.  
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One innovation in relation to Alesina and Perotti (1997) concerns productivity, A. It has been 
recognised since at least Barro (1990) that productivity may be at least partly supported by 
public services such as administration and the maintenance of the rule of law, education, 
health, and infrastructure development; so, public capital augments labour in production. 
Public services are supported by levying a flat tax rate τ across all incomes; a balanced 
budget is assumed, so this rate also equals the public services-to-GDP ratio. The public 
services are assumed non-rival, so all producers enjoy the same level without congestion 
effects. Accordingly, individual good production is characterised by: 
  Β          (3) 
Where Β is productivity, supported by public services, and therefore specified as: 
Β  β         (4) 
Taxation supports public services in the form of purchased goods; for tractability, the 
government is assumed to buy all goods (worldwide) in the same proportion as individual 
consumers. In this way, the price index of the government-consumed goods bundle is the 
same as the global price level P and no other changes need to be made to the way the global 
price level is calculated. The parameter 0<β<1 captures the production effectiveness of a 
given level of public services, and may therefore be interpreted as a measure of 
institutionally-determined efficiency in the model.  
 
Due to the monopolistic structure of the goods market, producers in all sectors enjoy a 
monopolistic mark-up of price over marginal cost, as is standard; so, the generic producer j 
sets their price according to: 
   !Β        (5) 
Where W is the nominal wage producer i faces, common across the domestic economy, as 
will be specified below. In analyses of monopolistic markets, it is customary to define the 
mark-up as " # $$  1, i.e. tightly linked to product market structure and the elasticity of 
substitution in utility (θ). Strictly speaking, the mark-up is closely connected to the elasticity 
of demand θ which is the same across all goods, so it should be assumed symmetric across 
the two economies. However, the elasticity of substitutions will be common across 
economies and goods, whereas a lot of interesting, real world-related possibilities arise if we 
let the mark-up differ across the two economies. Therefore, we shall let the mark-up be 
disconnected from the monopolistic structure, and assume that mark-ups across the two 
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economies can differ because of idiosyncratic factors across the two economies which we do 
not need to model.  Allowing for a different mark-up and nominal wage, symmetry applies to 
pricing in the foreign market.  
All goods for which  % &' will be produced by the Home (Foreign) economy. In view 
of the pricing rule, therefore, good i will be produced by H if: 1  "()/Β % 1  "'(')'/Β' 
The marginal good z is defined such that costs are the same across the two economies; it is 
hence defined implicitly from:  1  "(*)/Β  1  "'(*')'/Β'     (6) 
Any good i<z will be produced by H and j>z will be produced by F. We may therefore 
interpret z (0<z<1)as the (endogenous) extent of ‘market capture’ by the Home economy. 
Given the structure of utility, demand for good is given by:   /θ        (7H) 
where C is total domestic consumption in real terms (in units of the numeraire good), and 
symmetrically '  /θ'        (7F) 
Total aggregate demand comprises global consumption plus global government spending; the 
latter is assumed to be equal to τY+τ*Y* under the assumption of balanced budget. Since the 
two governments buy goods in the same proportion to their relative prices as individual 
consumers, individual goods demand and production is: 
  +,θ   '  τY  τ'Y' 
The model here features no investment or capital accumulation, therefore on a global scale, 
the sums of consumer and government spending should equal global output,   '  τY 
τ'Y'    '. Therefore, and in view of the pricing rule: 
   !Β. θ Y  Y'       (8) 
Given this output, total employment in the i-th sector is: 
/  (  ($  !Β. θ Y  Y'  
It is noteworthy that the effect of a rise in the unit labour requirement αi on employment in 
sector is twofold: positive since more labour is required per unit of good, and negative as 
demand will fall in the sector because of the higher price. Because of the assumption of θ>1, 
the latter effect dominates; it is worth contrasting that with the original DFS (1977) of Cobb-
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Douglas utility in which case the two effects exactly cancel out, so that employment is 
constant across sectors. As a result, total employment in the domestic economy is: 
1    /   ($	
*  !Β. θ Y  Y'    (9) 
Where C+C* is total consumption expenditure across the two economies in real terms. This is 
to be taken as exogenous by the union, whose behaviour will be described shortly.  
 
The next step in the analysis concerns the labour market and the determination of the real 
wage. As mentioned, our model is able to incorporate unemployment, in contrast to the 
essentially supply-side models of both DFS (1977) and Barro (1990).  Before turning to the 
union’s behaviour, we analyse Walrasian equilibrium; this will be a useful benchmark in 
what follows. In Walrasian equilibrium, when no union behaviour is involved, the nominal 
wage is set at such a level that unemployment is eliminated. (Strictly speaking, this is not 
entirely accurate. Since at least Blanchard (1986), we know that imperfect competition even 
on one side of the labour market suffices to generate structural unemployment, and this 
should be the case here even without union presence, just by the monopolistic power of the 
firms. Since we are interested however on what effects the union behaviour will have, we 
may more accurately say that we normalise unemployment to zero when there are no unions, 
even though there are monopolistic firms; we then measure the effects of unions on the 
deviations of unemployment from this benchmark – zero – level.)Accordingly, the Walrasian 
equilibrium real wage would be determined by: 
!01.  Β Y  Y'  ($	
*01 /θ     (10) 
Both demand (global demand) and supply (productivity, firm mark-up and international 
competitiveness) factors play a role here.  
 
We next turn to union behaviour (see e.g. Nickell, 1990). If there is a single ‘monopoly 
union’ in the Home economy, its welfare is assumed to be:  
2 # 3!. 1  τ         (11) 
whereτ is the tax rate. The union has the specific aim of raising the mean take-home pay over 
the entire workforce; the only alternative to employment for an economy-wide union is only 
unemployment, which is valued above as leisure. Maximising (11) with respect to the real 
wage (w ≡W/P), we have: 
1  1  τ  4345 !. 1  τ       (12) 
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The economy-wide union factors in the effect of the real wage on aggregate employment. We 
note that for any work to be offered at all, the take-home wage should be greater than the 
disutility of leisure, !. 1  τ   & 0. The union takes the tax rate and the level of global 
demand as given. Therefore, from equation (9) of unemployment, we get: 
4345  1   7θ .!  89       (13a) 
whereϕ 
8 #  :; ;4:< 4*45 & 0       (13b) 
is the effect of the union’s actions on the amount of goods z that the domestic economy 
produces. The positive sign follows from 4*45 % 0, the fact that a rising real wage makes the 
economy less competitive. In other words, the economy-wide union takes into account the 
fact that its policies will have significant side-effects on total production and indirectly 
therefore on unemployment. The internalisation of these externalities by a centralised union 
is some of the key findings of Calmfors and Driffill (1988). Here, we shall treat ϕ as 
parametric and interpret it as the degree of centralisation of the trade union and its 
concomitant extent of internalising the externalities it causes on the economy’s productive 
structure. Inserting (13a) into (12), we can solve for the real wage that the union settles for: 
!=>?>.  θ@θτA+0=>?>B τ@,      (14) 
This implicitly defines the real wage set by the monopoly union. Since the tax rate is of 
interest, we may totally-differentiate and re-arrange to get: 
40=>?>B4τ  !=>?>. θA0=>?>BθτA+C0=>?>B τ@,≈!
=>?>. τ D1  φE & 0;  (15) 
where 
1 & φ≡ 8 !
=>?>.  @τθ 1  8 2!=>?>.  @τ & 0 
withφ’(ϕ)>0, inherits from ϕ its properties and the interpretation of degree of centralisation of 
the union. The tax rate unambiguously increases the real wage set by the union. A greater 
centralisation and restraint of the union will lower the real wage – an effect discussed by 
Alesina and Perotti (1997). The conditions in the product market also feature in the union-set 
wage – a more inelastic market (lower θ) will feature a higher real wage, quite independently 
of the mark-up that the firm sets.  
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In practice, no union unilaterally sets the wage, as the ‘monopoly union’ model postulates. 
The ‘right to manage’ model (Oswald, 1986; Nickell, 1990) is instead a lot more realistic, 
assuming as it does that the union and firm negotiate the wage and then the firm sets 
employment according to its labour demand curve or its profit-maximising objective more 
generally. To solve for that would be too complicated, though; instead, we resort to the 
convenient shortcut that the actual wage is a geometric average of the Walrasian and the 
Union wages as a way of approximating the real wage set in a ‘right-to-manage’ setup (see 
Manning, 1987): 
)  )GHIH 
J )!K 
J
 
Where 0<γ<1 is the normalised strength (organisational, political, or other) of the union.  
Therefore, using (15), the semi-elasticity of the real wage with respect to the tax rate 
becomes: 
40B4τ /!.  γφτ         (16) 
Since the global price level is normalised to unity by (2), the union cannot affect it; (16) then 
also equals the effect of the tax on the nominal wage: 
4!/!4τ  γφτ          (16’) 
Having fixed the wage, and symmetrically for the Foreign economy, we can now pin down 
the extent of domestic production(and domestic capture of world markets), z. Given our 
definition of relative productivity, A(i)≡αi*/αi, A’(i)<0, and the condition for the marginal 
good, z,  (6), we have: 
L*   !/Β '!'/Β'        (17) 
Since A is an inverse function of i, the extent of H production (z) rises with the foreign 
product mark-up and nominal wage and falls with the domestic ones. These results are 
intuitive, as the product mark-up and wage costs directly affect product prices and therefore 
the relative competitiveness of the two economies. The exogenously given curvature of the 
A(i) function also plays a role: Apart from reflecting productivity in a narrow sense, this may 
also be interpreted as a country’s institutional features that have a bearing on productivity, as 
alluded to above. Since 1/A(i) is the cumulative distribution function of relative productivity, 
a rise in relative productivity by the domestic economy (a shift in 1/A(i) such that the new 
distribution is first-order stochastically dominated by the old), implies that the domestic 
economy is more productive across the board. This may be interpreted as a technological 
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improvement but it may also be a business-friendly institutional change. This type of change 
will induce a rise in A-1(.)for each level of cost competitiveness  !/Β '!'/Β'; therefore, ceteris 
paribus, the extent of H production (z) rises.  
In view of our specification for productive public services (4), (17) becomes: 
L*   !/MNβ '!'/Β'        (18)   
Totally-differentiating, we find that the tax rate will affect the degree of H production (z) as 
follows: 
∂*
∂τ
 γφτ βτO′*         (19) 
where L′. ≡dAi/di % 0. Therefore, we have the following sign: 
TUV W∂*
∂τ
X  TUVYτ τZ2  , τ[ # β
βγφ          (20) 
(20) defines a threshold tax rate, τ[,  around which the balance of effects of the tax rate on the 
degree of specialisation changes sign: The two effects are a positive one via public services 
and a negative one via the effect on the union-bargained wage. We thus get a hump-shaped 
graph of z(τ), which parallels the graph of growth on the tax rate in Barro (1990), but does 
not seem to have been derived in the literature in its own right. We therefore get an optimal 
tax rate, and government size (because of the balanced budget), from the point of view of 
maximising z, the extent of Home production and its ‘capture’ of world markets. A rise in the 
level of productivity, technical or institutional, as captured by A(i), raises the absolute value 
of dz/dτ (whatever its sign) in two mutually-reinforcing ways: firstly by reducing A’(.) for all 
i, and second, by increasing z, and therefore further decreasing A’(z).  
We thus arrive at the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: On the determinants of Home production (z): 
a) The tax rate exerts a dual effect on the degree of external specialisation (z): 
positively, via the productivity-enhancing public services, and negatively via the effect 
on the bargained real wage derived from union behaviour. The balance of the two 
effects gives the tax threshold in (20), τ[; this is also the optimal government size with 
respect to the maximisation of the share by H of world production (z).  
b) The strength of the union (greater γ) exacerbates the negative effect of the tax on the 
wage, as the union is better able to compensate for the loss of net pay in negotiations, 
and therefore reduces the threshold tax rate,τ[. 
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c) A more centralised union (higher ϕ, φ) mitigates the negative effects in (b), as the 
union internalises the negative externalities caused by its actions; hence it increases 
the threshold tax rate, τ[.  
d) Institutionally-determined efficiency (β) increases z and the threshold tax rate.  
e) Ceteris paribus, a greater degree of technological or institutional productivity, 
manifested in the productivity term A’(z), increases the effect that the tax rate has on 
the extent of Home production, z.  
Proof: All parts of the proposition readily follow from (20) and the associated discussion.  
From (8), noting the definition of productivity as based on public services (4), domestic 
output is: 
   	
*  +  !MNβ. θ 	
* ,   '    (21) 
The effect of the tax rate is: 
4N4M  θ \:]′:βθ^ Wγφτ  βMX       (22) 
Where 
0 % _ #   ' % 1 
is the relative size of H in the global economy, and will be assumed parametric and 
exogenous; correspondingly, the size of F is given (although there are two economies in the 
world).  
Competitiveness manifests itself via the relative price of the domestically produced goods. If 
we consider the effect of a tax change on real output, we have five channels: Firstly, the 
negative effect of the real wage on domestic demand via higher prices (the θ in the numerator 
of the first ratio times β/τon the RHS in 22); secondly, the effect of the tax rate on public 
services and productivity (the θγ(1-φ)/(1-τ) term). Thirdly, the effect of the tax rate on the 
degree of domestic capture of markets (the rest of the same numerator); this involves in turn a 
dual effect, the effect of the tax rate on public services and productivity, and the effect of the 
tax rate on the real wage bargained for by the union (that is, noting 19). Fourthly, the tax rate 
reduces net disposable income and consumption; fifth, government spending will rise with 
the tax rate; in fact, the last two channels exactly cancel out under our assumptions (note that 
global consumer demand equals (1-τ)Y+(1-τ*)Y*, while government spending is τY+τ*Y*). 
We assume that 1-βθ-y>0, i.e. that the effect of public services on productivity is not too 
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strong and that the domestic economic is not too large.  Under this maintained assumption, 
θ \:]′:βθ^ % 0, and  
TUV `		a  TUV bγ1  φ1  τ  βc 
Maximising output entails setting dY/dτ=0. The tax rate that brings that about is found to be 
the same threshold, τ[, as the one that maximises the extent of Home production in (20). Thus, 
the properties of the optimal tax rate with respect to Home output maximisation, are as 
described in Proposition 1. As with the extent of Home production (z), the tax rate exerts a 
hump-shaped effect on output, with output rising with tax below the threshold and falling 
beyond it. Again, these effects parallel Barro’s (1990) effects of the tax rate on growth; but 
here, the variety of effects considered is richer.  The main difference with Barro (1990) is that 
the negative effect is not due to the disincentive of taxation but to the effect of the tax on the 
real wage. Furthermore, the hump-shaped effect of tax on output mirrors its effect on Home 
production (z) except that it is exacerbated, comprising the effect of tax on both product 
capture plus the other channels discussed above.  
Turning now to the external balance, it is useful to consider the ‘export ratio’, the ratio of 
domestic to foreign exports: 
def # +  !/ΒMNβ. 
θ 	
* , '  ''
+  ''!'M'N'β. θ 	
* ,     
Exports of H in the numerator are generated by demand from F and is proportional to (7F); 
symmetrically for the F exports (denominator).   
Now, while global consumption equals global output (there is no saving or investment in this 
model), this need not be the case for each individual economy: GNP and GDP need not be 
equal. If one economy has accumulated claims on the other, then its GNP>GDP by the 
amount of interest payments on those assets; for the other economy, correspondingly, the 
opposite will be true. To model how these possibilities may arise is beyond the scope of this 
(it generally requires an intertemporal model of consumption spending). Here, we may take 
the relative GNP and therefore consumption that depends on it as parametric, and let  0 %
g # hhh' % 1 be the share of the domestic economy in global consumption, and 
correspondingly 1-c that of the foreign economy. In turn, global consumption is given by:   '  1  τ  1  τ ' ' 
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We thus have: 
def   +ijk0/Βl\βB ,θ4:< m ij'k'0'l'\'βB θ4: n_[      (24) 
where  
_[ # oDτ^τ'^EM'^oDτ^τ'^Eτ^      (25) 
is relative aggregate demand (F relative to H), and: 
4 [^4M   oYoDτ^τ'^Eτ^Zp     (26) 
In deriving the effect of the domestic tax rate on relative aggregate demand, we assume that 
this rate can affect global consumption – both Home and Foreign in proportion to relative 
country size. Note that the sign is unambiguously negative.  
The effect of the tax rate on Expis: 
	def	τ  def qθ  1	)	 1)  θ  1r s		 1  1t  */θ /θ	
*
	u	  	_[	 1_[v 
Using (16’), (19), (22) and (26), we get: 
4Kwx4τ  defyz{
z|}θ  1  \:]′:βθ^  B:B θ^ O′*~
7γφτ  βM9  4 [^4M ^[ z
z
   (27) 
All terms in the curly brackets are proportional to γφτ  βM except the final, positive, term. 
That term captures the effect of the domestic tax rate on relative demand in the two countries. 
If we were to ignore this effect, the same hum-shaped curve of Exp versus the tax rate would 
arise as the ones that characterise the extent of Home production and domestic output (cf.19 
and 22). The new consideration here is the last term inside the curly brackets, which reflects 
the effect of the domestic tax rate on the relative global demand (negative, to show that 
Foreign demand falls and Home rises). This term causes a deviation in the Exp-tax rate graph 
from the other graphs, in the sense that the threshold tax rate at which dExp/dτ changes sign 
is different than the one in the earlier graphs ().  
 
The threshold tax rate in this case is: 
 
β 2l2
θ 
\:]′:βθ
B:B θ ]′:γφ %       (28) 
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Hence, the threshold tax rate is lower than the ones that maximise Home production or 
output, essentially because of the added effect of domestic taxation on domestic demand and 
therefore imports. We thus have: 
 
Proposition 2: Determinants of relative export performance: 
a) For a sufficiently low tax rate (below the threshold specified in (b) below), relative 
export performance falls with trade union strength (γ), rises with trade union 
internalisation of the effects of its actions (ϕ, φ), and rises with productivity (A’(z)).  
b) Institutionally-determined efficiency (β) increases the export ratio at least for a 
sufficiently low tax rate; but its effect on the threshold tax rate is not clear-cut. 
c) The threshold tax here is lower than the threshold tax rate that maximises or Home 
production or output. This is because of the effects of taxation on Home and Foreign 
demand. 
 
 
3. Empirical results 
Building upon the implications of the theoretical framework of Section 2, this Section’s aim 
is to provide empirical estimates of the relationship between measures of the state sector, 
institutions and export performance. We begin by discussing the data, before proceeding to 
empirical specifications. 
 
3.1 Basic data  
The empirical analysis combines information from various data sources. Our panel covers 18 
OECD countries for the period 1980-2005.2Export performance is measured as the share of 
country’s exports to total world exports using data from UNCTAD. Our strategy is to 
augment a standard export regression (as e.g. in Carlin et al., 2001) with variables that 
capture state size, institutions and other variables. The proxy for cost competitiveness is an 
index of Relative Unit Labour Costs (RULC). We use data from EUKLEMS Growth and 
Productivity Accounts, 2009 edition (www.euklems.net) on value added, labour compensation 
and number of employees to construct Unit Labour Costs relative to our sample (of 18 OECD 
countries), following Bournakis (2013); the rationale and methodology of this construction 
are briefly described in Appendix A. We control for technological complexity and product 
                                                            
2We rely on different sources for the various data series; merging these data sources results in the 1980-2005 
data period.  
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differentiation of exports using a measure of industry-funded R&D as a percentage of GDP 
taken from Science and Technology Indicators, OECD (2010 edition).  
 
The government size variables are taken from the OECD. As a first proxy of government 
size, we use the total tax revenue as a share of GDP; we shall use both the variable itself and 
its quadratic to uncover any possible Barro (1990)-style hump curve of the type highlighted 
above. As social expenditure by the state does not only support productivity-enhancing public 
services but also transfer payments and other social types of expenditure, which may induce 
only the negative effects of taxation without any impact on productivity, any estimated 
positive effect of government size on exports may be interpreted as understating the true 
effect, and therefore being a low bound.   (It has been argued that purely social spending may 
improve competitiveness, see De Grauwe and Polan, 2005; and that a positive welfare state is 
optimal even in the face of globalisation, Molana and Montagna (2006); but in what follows 
we shall treat the pure social expenditures as non-productive.) But in order to investigate 
further the possibility that some government spending is not productive (but does entail 
taxation), we proceed in a dual way: Firstly, we also include separately the purely social 
spending from total spending (as a percentage of GDP) in order to have a measure of the 
(potentially) purely productive government spending. Secondly, we also consider other 
measures of state size, namely government spending, and government spending net of the 
purely social spending (all as percentages over GDP). 
 
A number of other variables will be described as go along. Appendix B provides descriptive 
statistics for all the empirical variables, and graphs for competitiveness, export performance, 
taxation, and R&D. 
 
3.2A benchmark specification 
We begin by specifying a benchmark econometric model that includes four key determinants 
of export performance as follows: 
2
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 . 5 , ,& ( )c t c t c t c t c t c t c tExp RULC R D Tax Tax Soc uα α α α α α= + + + + + +  (29) 
Where, for each country c in our sample and at time t: Expc,t  stands for the export share 
relative to total exports of OECD countries; this closely corresponds to the theoretical 
variable of Section 2. RULCc,t indicates unit labour costs relative to OECD, one of the main 
determinants of export performance (see Section 1). Taxc,t is the share of total tax revenue 
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relative to GDP, a key variable from the perspective of the analysis of Section 2, and SOCc,t is 
the share of social expenditures to GDP, which are non-productivity-enhancing state 
expenditures. R&Dc,t stands for the share of private R&D in GDP.  
 
The optimal (export performance maximising) tax share implied by the estimates is shown as ̂ in Tables 1-4,wherever relevant; this is the empirical counterpart to  in (28).In other 
words, the ̂ shown in the Tables is the government size that maximises export performance 
implied by our estimates. It is related to the estimated coefficients as follows, taking the 
coefficients of (29) as an example; as the empirical variable Tax≡100*τ, the tax-GDP ratio 
that maximises export performance is seen by differentiation of (29) to be: 
3 4ˆ / (200* )τ α α≡−  
Similarly, for the coefficients of the other equations and the estimates in the other Tables. 
The estimates of (29) by pooled OLS are shown in the first column of Table 1. Then we 
control for heterogeneity across countries by augmenting (29) with fixed effects (country 
dummies) as well as controlling for common global macroeconomic shocks using year 
dummies (Table 1, column 2). The F-tests in the last rows of Table 1test for the joint 
statistical significance of the country and year dummies. The coefficients of common 
macroeconomic shocks show insignificant shifts over time. Column 3 presents a variant by 
dropping Soc. On the whole, the results from columns 1-3 of Table 1present a successful 
basic model of export performance along the lines of neoclassical and new trade theory, 
without the quadratic tax term. The estimated coefficient of RULC is negative confirming the 
reverse effect of cost performance on exporting activity. Private R&D as a share to GDP 
maintains consistently a positive and robust coefficient indicating that the ability of OECD 
countries to innovate and provide a differentiated product in international markets constitutes 
a crucial source of competitive edge. The significantly negative coefficient of social 
expenditure (SOC) is in line with the findings of Alesina and Perotti (1997). Finally, the level 
term of the tax share is positive and significant in column 2, something confirmed in the 
variant in column 3 where social expenditures are dropped.  
 
Columns 4 to 5 then essentially replicate the above results with the introduction of the 
quadratic term of the tax share. While little changes in the other coefficients, the quadratic of 
the tax share is negative and significant, suggesting that the export-state size relationship can 
be more accurately described by a hump-shaped curve, along the lines explored in Section 2 
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and echoing Barro (1990). The tax share that maximises export performance implied by our 
estimates (̂) is of the order of 0.40, something that recurs rather consistently across all 
Tables and specifications. Interestingly, the size of the coefficients reveal that without 
controlling for the non-linear effect of taxation,  RULC and R&D have almost an identical 
effect on export shares while when the quadratic term of tax share is included, the results 
suggest that  OECD countries compete more on cost reduction rather than on innovation and 
R&D. 
 
Column 6 adds a proxy related to trade unions, about which more in the next sub-Section. 
Furthermore, we check the robustness of the previous results using instead of tax share, a 
measure of productive government spending (Gpr) that excludes expenses on social security 
from Government final consumption.  In other words, we replace (29) by: 
2
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 . 5 , ,& ( ) ( )pr prc t c t c t c t c t c t c tExp RULC R D G G Soc uα α α α α α= + + + + + +  (29’) 
Where Gpr≡G-Tax, with G being total government spending (consumption) – all variables as 
shares of GDP. Results from the linear and the quadratic term of this variable are shown in 
column 7, while column8 presents a variant with linear terms from productive spending and 
social spending only. The new estimates are now somewhat less significant from previous 
estimates but the main message prevails, government spending has a non-linear impact on 
export performance; the implied optimal government size is now considerably less, around 
015.  But as the estimates are insignificant, we do not pursue this line of inquiry further.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.3 Export performance and institutional rigidities 
This part of the econometric specification seeks to investigate how ‘institutions’ affect export 
performance and through what channels. This is he empirical counterpart to the parameter β 
of Section 2, which controls for the effectiveness of the public services in the aggregate 
production function, and which was found in general to increase the home economy’s 
production, capture of export markets and relative export performance (subject to some 
caveats summarised in Proposition 2). The first institutional feature to be considered is the 
share of trade union membership to total labour force (Union), for which continuous data 
exists (source: OECD). It is included in the column 4 of Table 1. The labour market and 
unemployment literature has long emphasised this variable for unemployment (see e.g., 
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Nickell, 1997), but its relevance for export performance has not been highlighted. According 
to Section 2, and Proposition 2, this variable should have a negative effect on relative export 
performance; the date however does not confirm this, giving this variable a positive but 
insignificant coefficient.  
 
We next turn attention to a number of other institutional features that capture market rigidity. 
The inefficiencies caused by rigidity are likely to be economy-wide but they affect 
disproportionally those sectors that are more exposed to international competition. 
Furthermore, such rigidities can affect decisions associated with R&D investment. R&D 
activity is the crucial element for the transformation to a knowledge-based economy whose 
competitive edge is not any more in cost reduction, but in innovation and product 
differentiation. This reasoning leads to the suggestion that the effect of such institutional 
rigidities on export performance may be felt via their effects on R&D. Thus, the institutional 
features that are described next will all be entered in a multiplicative way with R&D.3 
A labour market-related institutional feature is Employment Protection Legislation, also 
highlighted in the unemployment literature. This is an index ranging from 0 (a fully liberal 
labour market without any protection) to 6 (full protection); it is denoted as EPL. It is a 
standard argument that economies with heavily protected labour markets are less mobile 
hindering the allocation of resources towards more dynamic and efficient units (Nickell, 
1997). The key argument here is that resources wasted by heavy employment protection 
could have been used alternatively to fund R&D activity. However, the interaction term 
EPL×R&D in column 1 of Table 2 turns out to be positive and insignificant.  
 
Recent studies in the literature of applied industrial organisation (Arnold et al., 2008; 
Nicoletti and Scarpeta, 2003) have pointed out that rigid markets increase the cost of 
adjustment towards a long run steady state hurting in particular those industries that have the 
potential to excel in international markets. The second measure to be considered therefore is’ 
barriers to entrepreneurship’, essentially capturing administrative regulation that impacts 
negatively on economic performance; to be denoted as Bar.Enter.4Such regulation includes 
                                                            
3These institutional indices are only reported for three years (1988, 2003, 2008); furthermore they change slowly 
over time, so that they are almost time invariant. As a result, we entered them only as country means; this means 
that they could only be entered multiplicatively (i.e., in order to avoid perfect multicollinearity with country 
dummies). 
4
 All the institutional indices used in the empirics come from the OECD. They all range between 0 and 6, with 
values close to 6 indicating a very stringent market while values close to 0 mean a very market-friendly 
environment. 
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the existence of cartel practices in the market, the extent of bureaucratic procedures for 
setting up a new business or start-up costs, and poor legislation rules.5High barriers to 
entrepreneurship are associated with weak product market competition that lead once again to 
efficiency losses. The third index of institutional rigidities used is ‘barriers to competition’ 
(Bar.Comp). In theory, the nexus between monopolistic power and performance is not always 
straightforward. Monopolies usually experience economies of scale that allow reductions in 
the cost of production per unit, which benefits export involvement; nevertheless, 
monopolistic markets can always be a crucial source of slackness where dynamic efficiency 
and investment in R&D are not favoured. The institutional index used reflects distortions that 
exist in the market and prevent fair competition. According to this definition, barriers to 
competition capture the effect of non-contestable markets and the associated losses from the 
lack of competition. The last specification presented in Table 2 refers to ‘barriers to FDI’, 
denoted as Bar.FDI; this type of institutional rigidity represents impediments and obstacles 
that restrain inward FDI investment. Barriers to FDI can also be harmful to export 
performance mainly for two reasons. First, there is a long tradition in the FDI literature (De 
Mello, 1997, among many others) that highlights the role of foreign capital stock on 
technological expertise and knowledge spillovers. Therefore the presence of FDI is a conduit 
that enhances positive knowledge spillovers improving the recipient’s economy overall 
productivity. Second, multinational enterprises can contribute to current account as they 
usually develop substantial export activity. In general, impediments to FDI can also harm 
national export activity.  
 
With the institutional variables entering as interactive terms with R&D, the empirical 
specification takes the following form:  
2
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 . ,( ) & ( )hc t c t c c t c t c t c t c tXS RULC Ins R D Tax Tax Soc uβ β β θ β β β= + + + + + + +  (30) 
Where Insh stands for the h-th institutional index: Insh, h=EPL, Bar.Enter, Bar.Comp, 
Bar.FDI. The interaction terms between each of these rigidities and R&D, shown in columns 
2-4 of Table 2, are negative and significant, confirming the theoretical priors, and showing a 
strong role for these institutional features in shaping export performance. The higher is the 
degree of market rigidity (higher values for any of Insh), the lower is the private R&D share 
to GDP. Such a finding supports the view that chronic market distortions have a considerable 
adverse effect on dynamic efficiency, the effectiveness of R&D, and export performance. 
                                                            
5
 We refer the reader to Nicolettiet al.(1999) for the exact definitions of these indices as well as their empirical 
construction. Table A1 displays mean values for the countries of our sample.  
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Throughout Table 2, on the other hand, the estimates of the other variables (RULC, Tax, 
Tax2, Soc) are quite similar to the estimates in Table 1 and significant. In terms of the tax 
share, in particular, the non-linear role of government size is confirmed, as is the implied 
optimal government size (on the high side of the 0.40 benchmark uncovered earlier).  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
  
3.4 Robustness checks – Endogeneity Bias 
The results presented in Tables 1 and 2 are estimates from OLS with the inclusion of country 
fixed effects. OLS can provide consistent and unbiased estimates only if the exogeneity 
assumption holds: ( )
, ,
| 0c t c tuΕ Χ = , where E is the expectations operator and Χ is a vector of 
independent regressors. Admittedly, the above assumption is strong and not always 
admissible with empirical data, as the causality of the exports-RULC nexus is not always 
very clear. For example, export expansion is likely to increase profitability, making workers 
to request higher wages leading thus to higher labour compensation and RULC.6Hence, the 
contemporaneous specification might be subject to feedback effects and thus one needs to 
disentangle the causality issues between exports shares and RULC. We follow two strategies 
for controlling endogeneity bias between export shares and RULC.  The first approach is to 
consider all right-hand-side variables in (29) as predetermined, satisfying the assumption of 
weak exogeneity. This refinement is represented by lagging all regressors by one year. In 
such a case, the OLS can still provide consistent results. Nonetheless, this modification does 
not preclude the possibility that current export shares might cause feedback effects to future 
values of RULC, ( )
, , 1| 0c t c tu RULC +Ε ≠ .The most compelling way to ensure strict exogeneity 
is to use an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimator. This is our second and most preferable 
approach for addressing the possible endogeneity bias. The most crucial issue in IV 
estimation is the identification of valid instruments. In our context, RULC is a variable that 
measures cost performances taking into account only labour, while there are many other 
factors that drive costs. We argue that capital assets and energy materials are only indirectly 
related to export shares while they clearly impact on labour costs. For example, the degree of 
substitutability between labour, capital and energy services is strongly associated with the 
cost per unit of labour. Therefore, we use the contemporaneous and the one-year lagged 
                                                            
6If so, the relation would be positive, not the negative one shown by the estimated parameters. But the key thing 
is, there is potentially reverse causality between the two variables.  
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values of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) and energy resources as instruments for 
RULC;7these should correlated with the endogenous variable while being uncorrelated with 
the error term, making them valid instruments. 
 
Table 3reports results with IV of the benchmark specification as well as the specifications 
with the indices of institutional rigidities. We also show results from predetermined 
regressors lagging right-hand side covariates by one year. The statistics reported at the 
bottom of the Table are for exogeneity(Davidson-MacKinnon) and instrument identification 
(Sargan-Hansen), respectively. As per the null hypothesis of the Davidson-MacKinnon test, 
endogeneity bias among the regressors is not deleterious and thus OLS can provide consistent 
estimates. The probability values in all specifications indicate a clear rejection of the null 
except one. Overall, the Davidson-MacKinnon test provides enough evidence for the use of 
an IV estimator. The Sargan-Hansen statistic is a test of over-identifying restrictions referring 
essentially to the validity of instruments. The test follows the Chi-squared distribution with 
L-K degree of freedom, where L is the number of excluded instruments in the original 
equation and K is the number of regressors. The null hypothesis of the Sargan-Hansen test 
specifies that the instruments used should be uncorrelated with the error term and thus valid. 
On the whole, our instruments pass the identification test. The estimates in Table 3 show only 
minor changes in comparison with the OLS estimates of Table 2. Assuming weak exogeneity 
between RULC and export shares affects only the significance of the R&D coefficient. In the 
IV estimation, there are two changes compared to the OLS results, RULC and R&D are both 
insignificant. The pattern of the remaining variables is unchanged. In particular, the 
estimations with the interacted institutional variables are consistent with the results of Table 
2. The tax share estimates (of the linear and quadratic terms) are of the same signs and 
significant, and imply once again an optimal tax share of 0.40 (perhaps somewhat higher, and 
with more variability across specifications). Taken as a whole, the existence of endogeneity 
seems to affect only the statistical significance of RULC and R&D, while the effects of 
institutional rigidities and state size on export shares remain robust. 
 
 [TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
                                                            
7
 Both GFCF and energy are expressed as shares to GDP, energy resources are calculated as kilotonnes of oil-
equivalent. Data are taken by the World Bank Development Indicators database.  
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3.5 Robustness checks- Dynamic specifications 
Specifications (29), (29’) and (30) represent a static long-run equilibrium relation between 
export share and the various export determinants. The dependent variable in all cases is 
export share which is by definition bounded between 0 and 1 and thus it is considered as an 
I(0) variable. Nevertheless, estimates from the static specification in Table 1 have shown that 
coefficients of country dummies are statistically significant raising implicitly an issue of 
econometric specification. The significance of country fixed effects suggests that country 
differences do exist and are persistent. Countries may also differ in the speed of adjustment 
towards the long-run equilibrium, something not allowed by the static models described so 
far. A dynamic model is called for in order to capture thedynamic adjustment towards the 
steady state and to investigate country differences in this respect.  
To this end, (29) is augmented to: 
2
, 0 , 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 . ,& ( )c t c t c t c t c t c t c t c tExp Exp RULC R D Tax Tax Soc uγ γ γ γ γ γ−= + + + + + +  (31) 
The parameter (1-γ0) represents the speed of adjustment. An equivalent Error Correction 
Model (ECM) is represented as follows: 
*
, 0 , 1 , 1 , ,( ) jc t c t c t j c t c tExp Exp Exp uγ γ− −∆ = − + ∆Ζ + (32) 
Where the superscripted * indicates the equilibrium value of the export share from (31). For 
the ease of exposition in (31), we aggregate all export shares determinants in the vector Z. 
This structure also allows us to identify those factors driving the speed of long run 
adjustment. Given the negative impact of institutional rigidities found in Tables 2 and 3, we 
examine specifically whether labour market rigidities can affect the speed of adjustment. The 
degree of flexibility in the labour market is the most crucial determinant of how quickly the 
labour force can move from declining to expanding sectors contributing to a fast and efficient 
reallocation of the resources. The level of productive efficiency in the aggregate economy is 
also correlated with its export capacity. A similar logic applies to other institutional indices 
and their associated effect on the speed of long run adjustment. Exporting is burdened with 
additional sunk costs and various foreign market uncertainties requiring from suppliers 
substantial financial adequacy. To the extent that rigidities increase costs unnecessarily, 
export activity is likely to be constrained due to lack of financial viability. We capture how 
the presence of institutional rigidities affect export shares in a dynamic context by interacting 
lagged export shares with the institutional indices. The empirical counterpart of the ECM is 
now written as: 
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2
, 0 , 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 . ,& ( )c t c t c t c t c t c t c t c tExp Exp RULC R D Tax Tax Soc uγ γ γ γ γ γ−= + + + + + +  (33) 
The coefficient of adjustment 0γ  now represents the lagged dependent variable plus the lag 
dependent variable interacted with an institutional index h: 
 0 0 , 1 , 1
h
c t c t cExp Exp Insγ γ δ− −= + ×  
Where the institutional features now are a slightly different set: Insh, h=EPL, Bar.Enter, 
PMR, where PMR is an index of product market regulation (measured in a similar fashion as 
the others, from 0 – least regulated - to 6 – most restrictively regulated; source: OECD). A 
positive estimate of parameter δwould be evidence that countries with high degree of 
institutional inflexibility in a particular aspect of economic activity adjust more slowly to 
long run equilibrium.  As before, the institutional indices are calculated at their mean values 
for each country.8The presence of a lagged dependent variable in the right hand-side of (32) 
implies that a fixed effects estimator will be biased. According to Nickell (1981), the size of 
the bias depends on panel dimensionality. More precisely, the degree of bias is decreasing in 
the number of years, so for a sufficient number of years the potential bias converges to zero. 
In such a case, a fixed effects estimator can provide consistent and unbiased results. In our 
data set the number of years is approximately 25 and greater than the number of countries 
(18) (i.e. T>N) and thus model (32) can be estimated using a standard fixed effects routine. 
 
Results from the dynamic specification (33) are shown in Table 4. The long-run version of 
the estimated coefficients is obtained by the transformation γj/(1-γ0).  These long-run 
coefficients are shown in Table 5.  Comparing these coefficients with the static ones reported 
in Table 1, there are only minor differences. Coefficients of RULC, R&D share and Soc are 
very close; the only substantial difference is in the coefficients of the tax share terms are now 
insignificant. However, the non-linear structure is still present; the implied optimal (export 
share maximising) tax shares are now lower, a little higher than 030.  
 
[TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Another interesting remark from the dynamic estimates is that not all institutional variables 
play the same role in the convergence process towards the long-run equilibrium. In the first 
column of Table 4, the interacted term of lagged export share with employment protection 
                                                            
8Due to the fact that these variables change very slowly over time, we prefer taking the sample mean. 
27 
 
(EPL) is insignificant while chronic rigidities in entrepreneurship(Bar.Enter) and product 
market regulation (PMR) are shown to significantly decelerate the speed of adjustment. 
These results reveal a new message which is not highlighted in the literature so far. Nickell et 
al. (2008) have found that strong protectionism in the labour market slows down the speed of 
dynamic adjustment preventing a fast reallocation of resources. According to the findings of 
the present study (see Tables 2 and 4) the story is slightly different. A high degree of 
protection in the labour market is not very costly and its negative impact on the reallocation 
of resources is only minor. From the present analysis, it becomes apparent that there are other 
institutional rigidities more damaging for a country’s international competitiveness. This 
finding has a critical policy implication: Countries that seek to increase export market shares 
should implement reforms that eliminate barriers to competition and other chronic 
bureaucratic procedures rather than attempting labour market liberalising policies. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the role of government size and labour and product market 
‘institutions’ in determining export performance of OECD economies. We read the current 
state of the literature on empirical export performance as suggesting that unit labour costs, as 
a measure of competitiveness, is quite important but do leave room for improvement in the 
explanation of export shares, a view exemplified by Carlin et al. (2001). In addition to the 
‘deep’ structural/institutional characteristics suggested in that paper as further determinants, 
we argue that there are good grounds to argue that government size may also play an 
important explanatory role. Following the reasoning of Barro (1990), the role of this variable 
is likely to be non-linear. Thus, our main contribution is to investigate the (possibly non-
linear) role of government size and various institutional features in shaping export 
performance, in addition to the (maintained) role of unit labour costs and competitiveness. To 
this end, we first present a theoretical model of export performance, whose role is to 
formalise and sharpen these insights. The model, a variant of Dornbusch, Fischer and 
Samuelson (1997) with monopolistic competition, also includes a role for government, trade 
unions, and other labour market institutional features. Indeed, both sets of variables, 
government size and institutions, are shown to be relevant, the former in a Barro (1990)-type 
non-linear way.  
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We then proceed to estimation. Our results may be summarised as follows. Among the 
variables traditionally emphasised as determinants of international export shares, relative unit 
labour costs (RULC above) and the share of R&D expenditures in GDP (R&D) continue to 
play a significant role in the expected way. Our contribution is that we uncover a significant 
role for government in shaping export performance: The empirical estimates of the 
coefficients of the share of taxes in GDP, as a measure of the size of government and public 
services (Tax) and its quadratic term verify the pattern suggested by the previous theoretical 
arguments in a consistent fashion. The tax share is almost everywhere significant, revealing a 
non-linear effect on export shares that implies an export-maximising tax share of the order of 
40%. The institutional features we consider include measures of labour market rigidity 
(strength of trade unionism and employment protection) and product market rigidity (barriers 
to entrepreneurship, competition, FDI and a measure of product market regulation). The 
labour market rigidities are on the insignificant, but the first three of three of the four product 
market rigidities mentioned above play a significantly negative role in shaping exports, 
mainly via a negative effect on the effectiveness of R&D (as revealed by a significant 
multiplicative term between these institutional indices and R&D). Quite independently of the 
tax share, social expenditure, which is entirely non-productive in nature, maintains a robust 
negative sign clearly establishing a negative role of the welfare state regarding export 
performance. This result parallels those of Alesina and Perotti (1997): The obvious 
interpretation is that the funds for implementing a welfare policy are derived from taxation, 
causing a loss of efficiency and harming competitiveness. A policy corollary is that social 
policies should rely as much as possible on the provision of incentives rather than on direct 
financial aid. 
 
To sum up, the paper contributes to the current applied international trade literature by 
examining export performance within a framework that considers factors other than those 
found in standard trade theory, namely government size and institutions. Our results show 
that a public sector of a substantial size, around the 40% benchmark, is necessary to 
guarantee that economic activity occurs within a well functioning institutional environment. 
Nevertheless, as the public sector exceeds a certain optimal size then the state obtains a 
distortionary character affecting negatively the economy’s international competitiveness. 
This is mainly due to the need for a higher taxation. Additionally, various institutional 
features are important, but not always those that the literature or public discourse suggests: 
Labour market rigidities did not show up significantly; only product market rigidities appear 
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to be significant. In all, these results recommend that countries should pursue export-
promotion based on the dual strategy of productive public services and a dynamic product 
market.  
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Table 1: Export performance among OECD countries: benchmark specifications. 
Dependent variable:  Expc,t 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RULC -0.058*** -0.039*** -0.048*** -0.039*** -0.044*** -0.039*** -0.052*** -0.048*** 
 
[4.25] [6.13] [8.05] [6.09] [7.46] [6.16] [6.52] [5.40] 
R&D 0.039*** 0.002 0.001 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002 
 
[10.67] [1.37] [1.16] [2.41] [2.73] [2.25] [2.64] [1.22] 
Tax -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.0004*** 0.0029*** 0.0035*** 0.003*** 
 
 
 
[5.98] [3.78] [2.35] [5.17] [6.28] [5.15] 
 
 
(Tax)2 
  
 -337×10-5*** -449 
×10-5*** 
-338 
×10-5***   
   
 [4.56] [6.18] [4.55] 
 
 
Gpr
 
  
 
 
  0.001* 0.0011 
   
 
 
  [1.83] [0.31] 
(Gpr)2 
  
 
 
  
 
-383×10-5 
   
 
 
  
 
[0.25] 
Implied ̂ N/A N/A N/A 0.43 0.39 0.43 N/A 0.15 
Soc 0.002*** -0.001***  -0.0004***  -0.0004*** -0.001***  
 
[3.27] [5.57]  [3.86]  [3.75] [6.05]  
Union 
  
 
 
 0.00001 
 
 
   
 
 
 [0.28] 
 
 
Country Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 438 438 438 438 438 438 438 438 
R-squared 0.37 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 
F( 24,   392) 
 
1.10 1.0.8 1.32 1.22 0.72 0.34 1.06 
Prob>F 
 
(0.33) (0.33) (0.14) (0.14) (0.83) (0.99) (0.39) 
F( 17,   392) 
 
1916.03*** 918.20*** 1498.10*** 1090.31***  648.97*** 912.03*** 
Prob>F 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Notes: Numbers in brackets below coefficients refer to absolute t-statistics. Asterisks denote significance as 
follows, *** at 1%, ** at 5%.  In all specifications, the dependent variable is the share of exports of country i to 
total OECD exports. The estimator used in all specifications is OLS with country and year dummies where 
specified. The first F-statistic refers to the joint significance of year dummies and the second refers to the joint 
significance of country dummies. All estimates are consistent for cluster robust standard errors at the country 
level.̂is the optimal (export performance maximising) tax share implied by the estimated coefficients.  
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Table 2: Export performance among OECD countries: institutional rigidities and R&D. 
Dependent variable:  Expc,t 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 
RULC -0.040*** -0.043*** -0.038*** -0.048*** 
 
[5.981] [6.417] [6.071] [7.215] 
R&D -0.01 0.043*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 
 
[1.253] [5.197] [3.501] [5.372] 
R&D ×EPL 0.005 
   
 
[1.235] 
   
R&D ×Bar.Enter 
 
-0.020*** 
  
  
[5.101] 
  
R&D ×Bar.Comp 
  
-0.014** 
 
   
[3.286] 
 
R&D ×Bar.FDI 
   
-0.022*** 
    
[5.700] 
Tax 0.00159*** 0.00192*** 0.00184*** 0.00212*** 
 
[3.474] [4.311] [4.279] [4.808] 
(Tax)2 -188×10-5** -225×10-5*** -212×10-5*** -254×10-5*** 
 
[3.120] [3.685] [3.464] [4.124] 
Implied ̂ 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.41 
Soc -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
[5.398] [5.616] [4.840] [4.490] 
Country Dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No No No 
Observations 438 438 438 438 
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
F(23, 114) 1180.73 1534.47 1391.41 1724.22 
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: Numbers in brackets below coefficients refer to absolute t-statistics.  Asterisks denote 
significance as follows, *** at 1%, ** at 5%.  In all specifications the dependent variable is the share 
of exports of country i to total OECD exports. The estimator used in all specifications is OLS with 
country dummies. The reported estimates represent semi-elasticities calculated at the sample mean of 
each variable. The F-statistic refers to the joint significance of country dummies. All estimates 
presents are consistent for robust heteroscedastic standard errors.̂is the optimal (export performance 
maximising) tax share implied by the estimated coefficients.  
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Table 3: Exports in OECD: IV Estimation. Dependent variable:  Expc,t 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV 
RULC(t-1) -0.035*** 
   
 
  
 
[5.349] 
   
 
  
R&D(t-1) 0.001 
   
 
  
 
[0.681] 
   
 
  
Tax(t-1) 0.00202*** 
   
 
  
 
[4.615] 
   
 
  
(Tax)2(t-1) -0.0000253***       
 
[4.204] 
   
 
  
Soc. Expend(t-1) -0.001*** 
   
 
  
 
[5.328] 
   
 
  
RULC 
 
0.003 0.002 -0.014 -0.031* 0.001 -0.022 
  
[0.173] [0.125] [0.776] [1.84] [0.053] [1.125] 
R&D 
 
-0.001 -0.006 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 
  
[0.428] [1.168] [5.265] [5.590] [3.891] [4.705] 
R&D ×EPL 
  
0.003 
 
 
  
   
[1.090] 
 
 
  
R&D ×Bar.Enter 
   
-0.021*** -0.022*** 
  
    
[5.422] [5.840] 
  
R&D ×Bar.Comp 
    
 -0.014*** 
 
     
 [4.073] 
 
R&D ×Bar.FDI 
    
 
 
-0.020*** 
     
 
 
[4.934] 
Tax 
 
0.00207** 0.00202** 0.00218*** 0.00277**
* 
0.00225** 0.00233*** 
  
[2.795] [2.726] [3.142] [3.870] [3.098] [3.394] 
(Tax)2 
 
-
0.0000211* 
-
0.0000208* 
-
0.0000237* 
-
0.0000372
* 
-
0.0000234* 
-
0.0000262** 
  
[2.031] [2.008] [2.424] [3.820] [2.307] [2.704] 
Implied ̂ 0.40 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.37 0.48 0.45 
Soc 
 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  
[5.113] [5.110] [4.586]  [4.277] [3.621] 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No No No No No No 
Observations 421 421 421 421 421 421 421 
R-squared 0.986 0.11 0.12 0.23 0.20 0.16 0.23 
Wald Test 
 
27264 
(0.00) 
27379.46 
(0.00) 
30989.90 
(0.00) 
30242.36 
(0.00) 
28672.20 
(0.00) 
31525.55 
(0.00) 
Davidson-
MacKinnon  
6.23 
(0.01) 
5.99 
(0.01) 
2.65 
(0.10) 
1.07 
(0.30) 
5.10 
(0.02) 
1.78 
(0.18) 
Sargan-Hansen 
 
3.806 
(0.28) 
4.170 
(0.24) 
2.145 
(0.54) 
11.480 
(0.01) 
7.52 
(0.05) 
3.82 
(0.28) 
Notes: In all specifications the dependent variable is the share of exports of countryi to total OECD 
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exports. Numbers in brackets below coefficients refer to absolute t-statistics. Asterisks denote 
significance as follows, *** at 1%, ** at 5%.  The endogenous variable in IV estimations is RULC 
and the instruments used are GFCFt , GFCFt-1, ENEt and ENEt-1 where GFCF is the share of gross fixed 
capital formation to GDP and ENE is the energy of oil equivalent per capita. Wald test refers to 
whether the regressors included are jointly statically significant. Davidson-MacKinnon statistic tests 
the exogeneity assumption and under the null hypothesis it is distributed with F(m, N-K), where m is 
the number of potentially endogenous variables. The Sargan-Hansen statistic tests the orthogonality 
condition for a panel and under the null hypothesis the test follows the Chi-squared distribution, see 
the text for more details. Numbers in parentheses refer to p-values of diagnostic tests.  All estimates 
presented are calculated for robust heteroscedastic standard errors. ̂is the optimal (export 
performance maximising) tax share implied by the estimated coefficients. 
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Table 4: Export performance among OECD countries: dynamics and institutions. 
Dependent variable:  Expc,t 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 
Expt-1 0.783*** 0.537*** 0.624*** 
 
[12.61] [4.54] [8.30] 
Expt-1 ×EPL 0.019 
  
 
[0.70] 
  
Expt-1× Bar.Enter 
 
0.114* 
 
  
[2.35] 
 
Expt-1×PMR 
  
0.101 
   
[2.08] 
RULC -0.007** -0.008** -0.007** 
 
[3.31] [3.04] [3.31] 
R&D 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.61] [0.79] [0.61] 
Tax 0.00060 0.00055 0.00052 
 
[1.09] [1.13] [1.09] 
(Tax)2 -937×10-6 -861×10-6 -816×10-6 
 
[1.23] [1.33] [1.23] 
Implied ̂ 0.32 0.32 0.32 
Soc -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
[1.11] [1.08] [1.11] 
Year Fixed Effects No No No 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 420 420 420 
R-squared 0.716 0.718 0.717 
Notes: Numbers in brackets below coefficients refer to absolute t-statistics. Asterisks denote 
significance as follows, *** 1%, **5%.  The estimation technique is a within fixed effects estimators. 
All estimates presented are calculated for robust heteroscedastic standarderrors.̂is the optimal (export 
performance maximising) tax share implied by the estimated coefficients.  
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Table 5: Implied long-run estimates for export share determinants (source: Table 4)  
RULC, 1
01
γ
γ
     − 
 0.043 0.020 0.025 
R&D, 2
01
γ
γ
     − 
 0.017 0.008 0.010 
Tax, 3
01
γ
γ
     − 
 0.0087 0.0041 0.0050 
Soc, 4
01
γ
γ
     − 
 0.039 0.018 0.023 
Note: The three columns of this Table draw on the estimated coefficients shown in the corresponding 
three columns of Table 4.  
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Appendices  
Appendix A: Methodology of construction of RULC 
RULC has been constructed as in Bournakis (2013), as follows: Unit Labour 
Cost(ULC)combines information on (a) cost per unit of labour input and (b) an index of 
labour productivity. For country c at time t, we define ULC as follows (without subscripts):
  
/
WULC
Y N
=  (A1) 
W represents wages per worker measured as labour compensation per working hour while the 
lower ratio (Y/N) indicates labour productivity defined as value added per hour 
worked.9RULCaim to reflect cost competiveness in country c relative to cost in other 
countries of the sample. For that purpose, we weight ULC by the arithmetic mean of ULC in 
all countries of the sample (denoted by an overbar):  
,
,
c t
c t
t
ULC
RULC
ULC
=  (A2) 
For comparisons to be meaningful across countries, values in (A2) must be expressed in a 
common currency. We use Purchasing Power Parity (ppp)-exchange rate to express all values 
in constant 2000 USD; additionally, the mean unit labour cost is computed as: 
18
18
1
1
1 ( / )
1
c
t
c
W
cULC
Y N
c
=
=
−
=
−
∑
∑
 (A3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
9
 The difference between H and N is that the former refers to total number of hours including self-employed 
while N refers only to total hours worked by employees. 
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Appendix B: Summary statistics and graphs 
 
Table B1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Export share 438 5.71 5.61 0.27 21.99 
RULC 450 1.00 0.18 0.74 1.69 
Tax share 450 35.70 8.40 15.65 52.26 
Social Expenditure share 450 20.98 6.28 3.00 36.20 
Private R&D share 450 1.01 0.63 0.03 2.96 
EPL 450 2.14 0.91 0.21 3.63 
Barriers to Entrepreneurship 450 2.25 0.45 1.45 3.05 
Barriers to Competition 450 2.41 0.52 1.72 3.22 
Barriers to FDI 450 1.59 0.74 0.09 2.92 
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TableB2: Indices of Institutional Rigidities, Mean Values (1985-2008) (OECD) 
Country  EPL Barriers to Entrepreneurship Barriers to Competition Barriers to FDI 
Australia 1.11 1.56 2.20 1.72 
Austria 2.12 2.19 3.22 2.14 
Belgium 2.53 2.33 2.31 1.20 
Denmark 1.74 1.82 2.77 1.23 
Spain 3.16 2.39 2.03 1.61 
Finland  2.09 2.41 1.94 1.70 
France 3.01 3.05 3.06 2.83 
Germany 2.55 2.31 1.91 0.09 
Greece 3.26 2.68 3.16 2.34 
Ireland 0.99 1.60 1.72 1.20 
Italy 2.69 2.74 2.95 2.92 
Japan 1.59 2.97 3.01 1.85 
Korea 2.32 2.73 2.24 2.35 
Netherlands 2.40 2.05 1.92 1.06 
Portugal 3.63 2.15 2.36 1.43 
Sweden 2.47 2.11 1.89 1.45 
UK 0.66 1.45 1.73 0.24 
USA 0.21 2.02 2.94 1.18 
Total 2.14 2.25 2.41 1.59 
Notes: EPL refers to Employment Protection Legislation. All these indices are from the OECD; their values 
range from 0 to 6. Values close to zero indicate a market that is less stringent while values closer to the upper 
bound indicate a restrictive market. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates time trends of export shares and tax shares for our sample. A remark that 
can be made from Figure 1 is that export shares have a high degree of persistence while tax 
shares are stable indicating mainly the pro-cyclical nature of tax revenue. Interestingly, one 
can state that tax revenue follows an upward trend in the majority of countries with 
Scandinavia countries (Sweden, Finland, and Denmark) to have the highest share. 
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Figure B1: Export share of 18 OECD Countries 
 
 
  Notes: Country exports as a percentage of world exports 
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Figure B2: Tax shares of 18 OECD Countries 
 
 
Notes: Total tax receipts as a percentage over GDP 
 
  
10
20
30
40
50
10
20
30
40
50
10
20
30
40
50
10
20
30
40
50
1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010
1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010
AUSTRALIA AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK SPAIN
FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND
ITALY JAPAN KOREA NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL
SWEEDEN UK USA
(%
)T
ax
 
re
v
en
u
e 
as
 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
o
f G
D
P
Year
44 
 
Figure B3:  Relative Unit Labour Costs (RULC)  
 
Note: The methodology of construction is reviewed in Appendix A.  
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Figure B4: R&D Expenditure (%) to GDP in 18 OECD Countries 
 
 
  
0
1
2
3
0
1
2
3
0
1
2
3
0
1
2
3
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
AUSTRALIA AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK SPAIN
FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND
ITALY JAPAN KOREA NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL
SWEDEN UK USAIn
du
st
ry
-
fin
an
ce
d 
R&
D
(%
) to
 
G
D
P
Year
46 
 
Appendix C: Notes (NOT for publication): 
1. Using the pricing rule above and the definition of the aggregate (global) price level, 
we have: 
   1  "()/Βθ* 	
   1  "'(')'/Β'θ

* 	

/θ
 
 
 
2. On deriving (14) – inserting (13a) into (12) gives:  
1  τ  sθ )  8t ) 1  τ   
Or 
1  τ  θ1  τ  θ )  8) 1  τ   
 
3. On (15): Differentiating (14) with respect to τ: 	!=>?>.	τ 1 )GHIH 81  τθ  11  τ  8 !=>?>. 1  τ   
 )GHIH θ  1  8
!=>?>.θ  11  τ  8 !=>?>. 1  τ   
From this, we get (15) immediately.  
 
4. On the derivation of (22). Differentiating (21) w.r.t. the tax rate, we have: 
		  βθ		  _		  θ	)	  * 	u	 
Re-arranging, we get: 
 
		  11  βθ _ bθβ  θγ1  φ1  τ  * 	u	c 
 Inserting (19), we get (22). 
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5. NOTE: FOR THE definition of _[ in (25): The ExpRat is proportional to:  
 '  ''    1  g  '  ''g  '    1  gD1  τ  1  τ ' 'E  ' 'gD  1  τ ' 'E  τ  
From here, the definition follows if we divide both numerator and denominator by 
Y+Y*.  
 
6. Note for (26): Note an intermediate expression: 	_[	   1  g_D_[  1EgD1  τ_  1  τ '1  _E  τ_ 
 
7. NOTE: INTERMEDIATE EXPRESSION in the derivation of (27): 	def	τ
 def   1  θ 1r θ  1  N:O′*1  βθ 1  _
 */θ /θ	
*
1L′u~ γ1  φ1  τ  β  	_[	 1_[ 
Note that under (19), we have  /θ	
*  _. 
 
8. For completeness, the foreign counterpart to output (21) is given by: 
'   	
*  m 1  "
'(')'''β 
θ 	
* n   ' 
 
